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I.
INTRODUCTION
N the law of compensation it is generally recognized that a causal relation
must exist between the loss or damage for which compensation is sought
and the act or omission of which complaint is made. If the person suffering
damage cannot establish such relationship one of the main conditions for
receiving compensation is unfulfilled.
In this study, however, the expression "cause of damage" has another
causal relation in view. It concerns the chain of causation leading up to the
phenomenon, for example an accident, which is the established cause of the
damage. The expression refers, in other words, to the answer to be given to
the question: Why did the phenomenon, causing the damage, occur? Similarly, "an unknown cause of damage" is a short expression for a situation
which is characterized by lack of knowledge of the chain of events leading
up to the phenomenon causing damage.
The legal relevance of such knowledge is dependent on the principle of
liability to 'be applied in a given case. If, for example, the mere fact that
damage has been caused by a certain activity entails the liability of a given
person, it is of no significance for the imposing of liability to investigate
the causes for which the activity did result in damage. Once the causal
relation between the activity in question and the damage has been established the conditions for receiving compensation are fulfilled. On the other
hand, elucidation of the circumstances around the phenomenon causing
damage will be of primary importance if the liability is based on fault,'
or presumption of fault. For in such cases the party upon whom the burden
of proof is imposed will naturally try to explore and explain the chain of
causation leading up to the alleged wrong in order to satisfy the requirements of his onus. The same is true, of course, if not the liability itself, but
certain other legal effects, for example an aggravated form of liability, are
NOTE: Footnotes follow end of article on Pages 21 to 28.
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conditioned upon the damage being caused by fault (or especially defined
faults).
It will be seen that the problems concerning the unknown cause of
damage are intimately connected with the question of the burden of proof
and the allocation of such burden of proof. Different definitions and understandings have been attached to this onus in theory and in practice. However, it seems justified to state that the essential idea behind the burden
of proof is a risk of the impossibility of furnishing sufficient evidence. The
person upon whom the burden is imposed and who ,has not been able to
furnish the required proof must bear the risk that his non-furnishing of
evidence may have the effect that the court's evaluation of the facts of the
case will be to his disadvantage. Also the principles of the allocation of
the burden of proof have been a controversial subject and widely divided
opinions have been expressed on this topic. If, however, the problem is
approached with the view of letting the onus be an instrument to obtain the
most practical and suitable results in the application of the law, the burden
of proof is to be imposed upon the one who, on the average, has the facilities
of securing proof of the relevant facts. 2 In this way evidence is secured in
most cases and the number of unexplained cases will be kept to a minimum.
Thus- as it has been said 3-suitable rules of burden of proof are characterized by their ability to render themselves superfluous!
Although the unknown cause of damage is a problem which may occur
in many different aspects of the law of compensation, it is, however, a
characteristic feature of aviation. Total losses are more frequent in aviation
than in most other kinds of activity, and it is particularly among such losses
that the unexplained cases are to be found. Yet, to state with any certainty
the ratio of the number of unknown cases to the total number of air accidents 4 seems quite impossible, and different authors give differing percentages. In ICAO's 5 Aircraft Accident Digest No. 96 a table containing 53
reported accidents from 1957 states three of these to have been caused by
undetermined reasons. 7 But an examination of the reports included in the
Digest reveals unknown elements to be found in at least fourteen of the
reported cases. These figures are not very informative, however, considering
that the reported cases form only part of the total number of known accidents occurring during 1957. But on one thing all concerned agree: the cases
of unknown cause of damage constitute a sufficiently great part of the total
number of cases in which damage occurs to create a problem of practical
importance in air law. And the developments in aviation do not seem to
change this state of things. While the technical progress, it is hoped, will
continuously add to the safety of flight, the risk of unexplained cause of
damage seems also to be growing. Speed is being increased, altitudes are
becoming greater, and as a consequence of the extending cruising range the
air services are operating over more and more inaccessible regions of the
globe. But with each of these factors the possibilities of total losses are
increasing, also.
"The unknown cause of damage" is an equivocal expression. It covers a
long scale of different degrees of lack of knowledge of the chain of events
leading up to the phenomenon causing damage. At one end of this scale
cases of completely unknown cause of damage are to be found. A typical
example is the case where an aircraft, having no radio contact with its
surroundings, disappears into the ocean without survivors and without eyewitnesses. In such a situation all links of the chain of causation leading up
to the disaster are unexplained; the only thing known is that the accident
did occur. Further down the scale are cases in which some of the links may
be known, while one or more others still remain unknown. It is established,
for example, that after the pilot had chosen a certain altitude the aircraft
encountered violent turbulences and heavy icing conditions which forced

AIR CARRIER'S LIABILITY
it downwards until it finally crashed. All the manoeuvres of the aircraft
from the moment it met bad weather conditions until its final crash may
have been explained in detail, but it still remains unknown why the original
altitude was chosen. Or it is known, for example, that a chain of established
technical failures led to an explosion, but the causes of the failure starting
this chain remain unexplained.
From this scale of cases comprising a higher or lesser degree of unknown
elements it appears that even the borderline itself between unknown and
known causes of damage is not sharp and definite. The transition is entirely
gradual. And it is, of course, impossible to give any criterion for fixing the
dividing line. Each individual case must be considered by the court through
an overall assessment of all relevant evidence. In this connection it must be
borne in mind that the establishment by technical experts of one or more
causes of accident in their investigation reports are not binding on the court
in its decision with regard to the legal consequences of the accident. The
assessment of evidence must be the result of an independent legal evaluation.
SYSTEMATICS
The subject of this study is the air carrier's liability-contractual as well
as delictual-in international air law in cases where the cause of damage
remains completely or partially unknown. The purpose is, in other words,
to give an answer to the question: What is the effect with respect to the
air carrier's liability in international air law of the fact that damage has
occurred for reasons unknown?
In the first place, the air carrier's liability towards passengers, or their
dependents, and consignors of goods will be examined (section II). The
relevant provisions are found in the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw,
October 12, 1929, (the Warsaw Convention).8 A Protocol to amend the
Convention was signed at The Hague, September 28, 1955, 9 and one of the
provisions therein contained will be considered in furtherance of the examination of the Warsaw Convention (p.'124 to 127).
Thereafter, the problems concerning the unknown cause of damage will
be considered in respect of the liability for damage caused to third parties
on the surface (section III). The international rules are to be found in
the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on
the Surface, signed at Rome, October 7, 1952, (the Rome Convention).1o It
will 'be seen that the question under consideration will raise only minor
problems in connection with this Convention.
Finally, the unexplained cause of damage will be examined with regard
to damage caused by aerial collisions (section IV). It is true that no international rules are in existence for the moment in respect of such damage,
but a draft convention on aerial collisions has been drawn up,'1 and steps
have been taken to speed up the efforts to reach an international agree12
ment in this field as soon as possible.
II.
THE UNKNOWN

A.

CAUSE OF DAMAGE AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION

Scope of Application of the Convention

The Warsaw Convention applies to certain, geographically restricted,
cases of international carriage of persons, baggage and goods performed by
an air transport undertaking, or by any person if the carriage is performed
for reward. Excluded is, however, carriage performed under the terms of
any international postal Convention, see Art. 2 paragraph 2.13 Also excluded
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is carriage by air performed by way of experimental trial by air navigation
undertakings with the view to the establishment of a regular line of air
navigation, as well as carriage performed in extraordinary circumstances
outside the normal scope of an air carrier's business, Art 34.14
International is, for the purposes of the Convention, any carriage in
which, according to the agreement between the parties, the places of
departure and destination are situated within the territory of two Contracting States, or within the territory of one Contracting State if there is an
agreed stopping place within the territory of another State-be it or not a
Contracting State, see Art. 1 paragraph 2.15 A carriage to be performed by
several successive air carriers is deemed-as stated in paragraph 3 of Art. 1
-to be one undivided carriage, if it has been regarded by the parties as a
single operation, whether it had been agreed upon under the form of a
single contract or a series of contracts, and it does not lose its international
character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory of the same Contracting State.
At The Hague Conference, 1955, the possibilities of extending the scope
of application of the Convention were discussed.' 6 It was decided, however,
to retain the present scope which is, above all, a function of the jurisdictional authority of the Convention. 17 Any extension, according to which the
Convention would govern carriage giving rise frequently to cases before the
courts of non-contracting States, would create uncertainty in practice with
respect to the applicability of the Convention.
Art. 1 paragraph 2 presupposes the existence of an agreement concerning
the carriage. This agreement is the contract of carriage which is mentioned
in several of the provisions of the Convention 8 and which was also stressed
in the preparatory works of the Convention as the basis for the application
of the rules of the Convention. 19 Consequently, carriage of a stowaway, for
20
example, is governed not by the Warsaw Convention, but by national law.
More doubtful is the question whether the carriage of the employees of
the carrier is covered by the Convention. Employees exercising their functions on board the aircraft seem not to cause any problem. Their relationship
to the carrier will clearly fall outside the scope of the Convention. On the
other hand, almost every one agrees that the Convention does cover carriage
21
of an employee traveling with a free ticket for his own pleasure or business.
Doubt may arise, however, in connection with the carriage of the employee whose travel with the carrier forms part of the performance of his
duties for this carrier. The question seems not to have been submitted to
the courts for decision. The majority of authors, however, holds the opinion
that no contract of carriage exists in such cases and, accordingly, that the
Convention will not apply. 22 But views to the contrary have also been
expressed. 28 A natural interpretation of the Warsaw Convention seems to
lead to the conclusion that such cases are not covered by the Convention.
The purpose of the Warsaw Convention is to regulate the relations between
the carrier and the passengers or consignors as contracting parties to the
agreement of carriage., As soon as a contract of employment exists between
the parties, and the employee is traveling to exercise his duties under such
a contract, an entirely new element has been introduced. There exists no
necessity of applying the Convention in such cases, and it appears advisable
not to do so. Such relationships seem not to need, nor to be suitable for,
international regulations.
In connection with the requirements for the existence of a contract of
carriage, attention must be drawn to the draft convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air performed by
a person other than the contracting carrier. 24 If carriage governed by the
Warsaw Convention or any part of such carriage is performed by a person
other than the contracting carrier, the rights and obligations of the per-
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forming carrier shall, in respect of the carriage which he performs, be
those of a carrier under the Warsaw Convention, see Art. III of the draft.
In these cases the rules of the Warsaw Convention will be applicable between
25
parties who have no contractual relationship to each other. Finally, the carriage must be for reward unless performed by an air
transport undertaking, see Art. 1 paragraph 1 of the Convention. In the
individual case it may be difficult to judge whether or not this requirement
has been fulfilled. It seems natural to let the commercial aspect of the agree26
ment concerning the carriage be the decisive factor.
B.

The Principles of Liability; Chapter III of the Convention

The provisions concerning the carrier's liability are found in Chapter III.
They are mandatory in the sense that any provision tending to relieve the
carrier of his liability or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down
in the Convention shall be null and void, see Art. 23. As a further safeguard
Art. 32 states that any clause contained in the contract of carriage and all
special agreements entered into before the damage occurred by which the
parties purport to depart from the rules laid down by the Convention,
whether by deciding the law to be applied or by altering the rules as to
jurisdiction shall also be null and void.
Another characteristic feature of the system of liability laid down by the
Convention is the limitation of liability. To a certain degree this limitation
may be considered as a counterpart of the mandatory character of the rules
of liability. 27 Art. 22 limits the liability of the carrier to the sum of 125,000
Poincar6 francs 28 (about 8,300 U.S. dollars) towards each passenger, 250
Poincar6 francs (about 16.60 U.S. dollars) per kilogram with respect to
registered baggage and to goods, and 5,000 Poincar6 francs (about 332 U.S.
dollars) per passenger with regard to objects of which the passenger takes
charge himself. These limits of liability cannot be invoked by the carrier,
however, if it is proved that he or his agents have caused the damage by
wilful misconduct ("dol") or such fault on their part as, in accordance with
the law of the courts
seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to
29
wilful misconduct.
According to Art. 17, 18 and 19 the carrier is liable for damage sustained
in the event of the death or injury of a passenger, or destruction or loss of,
or of damage to baggage or goods, or for damage occasioned by delay in the
carriage by air. In Art. 17 and 18 special (and different) periods are indicated to delimit the concept of "air carriage" within which the accident or
occurrence causing the damage must have taken place in order to entail the
carrier's liability. It will be seen that while liability pursuant to Art. 17 for
death or injury of a passenger is conditioned upon the taking place of an
accident, such condition is not to be found in respect of liability for damage
to or loss of goods in Art. 18 (cf. the words: "the occurrence which caused
the damage" 30 ).
These provisions of liability must, however, be read in connection with
Art. 20 of the Convention which runs as follows:
"(1) The carrier is not liable if he proves that he and his agents have
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible
for him and them to take such measures.
(2) In the carriage of goods and luggage the carrier is not liable if
he proves that the damage was occasioned by negligent pilotage or negligence in the steering of the aircraft or in navigation and that, in all other
respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage."
Thus it appears that the principle of liability laid down by the Convention is to the effect that the carrier is liable unless he proves that he and
his servants or agents3 1 have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
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damage or that it was impossible for him and them to take such measures.
In addition, as far as carriage of goods and baggage is concerned, the carrier
is not to be held liable for the so-called nautic faults committed by his
servants or agents. The problem to be examined is, accordingly, whether the
carrier is able to furnish the required proof pursuant to Art. 20 paragraph
1 and 2 respectively and thus relieve himself of liability in cases where the
chain of causation leading up to the phenomenon causing damage--i.e.
the accident or an occurrence taking place during the carriage by airremains unknown. With respect to liability for damage contemplated by
Art. 17, it is presupposed that a causal relation between the accident and
the damage has been established. With regard to Art. 18 paragraph 1 the
existence of a causal relation between an occurrence taking place during
the carriage by air as defined in Art. 18 paragraph 2 and the damage is
presupposed to have been proved. If Art. 18 implies a causal relationship
must bear the
between the carriage by air and this occurrence the carrier
8 2
burden of proof that such a relationship does not exist.

After that it remains to 'be asked whether, still in cases of unexplained
cause of damage, the carrier may be held liable in excess of the limitations
of liability contained in Art. 22 of the Convention on the grounds that
damage has been caused by wilful misconduct, see Art. 25 paragraph 1.
C. Article 20 Paragraph1

The examination of Art. 20 paragraph 1 raises two main questions. In
the first place, the meaning of the expression "all necessary measures" must
be studied. This is a problem in connection with the interpretation of the
provision in general. Secondly, the requirements to satisfy the carrier's
burden of proof pursuant to Art. 20 paragraph 1 will be examined. This is
a question in close relationship to the problems concerning the unknown
cause of damage. It must be borne in mind, however, that the two questions
will usually be intimately related in practice. The questions of what to prove
and how to prove it will generally be answered collectively by the court on
the basis of an overall evaluation.
On the other hand, for analytical reasons, it seems preferable to treat
independently of the other questions involved, certain difficulties of interpretation attached to the words "all necessary measures."
1. "ALL NECESSARY MEASURES"

If understood in their literal sense the words of Art. 20 paragraph 1
should not leave much substance to the Article. If all necessary measures
had been taken to avoid the damage no damage would occur at all. The
article would then be restricted to apply to cases where it was impossible
for the carrier and his servants or agents to take such measures, i.e. in
cases amounting to force majeure. It is indubitable, however, that an interpretation according to which Art. 20 paragraph 1 is reduced to comprise
force majeure cases only, is contrary to the purposes behind Art. 20 and
thus behind the entire system of liability of the Convention of which Art. 20
is the very keystone. An examination of the genesis of the present wording
of Art. 20 will reveal what the draftsmen of the Convention had in mind
when framing its provisions of liability.
a. PreparatoryWorks
The rudiments of the present Art. 20 are to be found in the draft convention drawn up 'by the First International Conference on Private Air Law,
held in Paris, October 27 to November 6, 1925.33 Art. 5 paragraph 1 of the
draft held the carrier liable for accidents, losses, damages and delays, but
in paragraph 2 it was added that the carrier was not liable if he proved to
have taken "reasonable measures" ("les mesures raisonnables") to avoid
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the damage. Art. 6 made
the carrier liable also for the faults committed by
34
his servants or agents.
In his report to the Conference, dated November 2, 1925, M. Pittard,
Rapporteur, explained the system of liability as laid down in the draft
convention 35 and stated in this connection inter alia:
"La Commission s'est demand~e quel regime de responsabilit6 ilfallait
adopter: risque ou faute. L'opinion g~n~rale est que ... ilfaut admettre
la th~orie de la faute.
II est donc juste de ne pas imposer au transporteur une responsabilit6
absolue et de le d~gager de toute responsabilit6 lorsqu'il a pris les
mesures raisonnables et normales pour 6viter le dommage; c'est la diligence que 'on peut exiger du bon pdre de famille.
...iln'y a pas de responsabilit6 sans faute, celle-ci 6tant presume
jusqu'a preuve rapport6e de la diligence raisonnable."3 6
From these remarks it appears clearly that the liability of the carrier
was to be based on fault. The carrier was exonerated from liability on the
proof that neither he nor his servants or agents have committed any faults,
i.e. that they have acted with due diligence or the diligence of a bonus pater
familias. And this-most well-known-idea of liability found expression in
the words that the carrier is not liable "if he proves that he (and his servants or agents) have taken reasonable measures to avoid the damage."
Although not stated directly in the report, there can be no doubt that
the expression "les mesures raisonnables" has been inspired by the AngloSaxon idea of "due diligence." 8 7 Moreover, it was not the first time that this
notion had gained a footing in a French legal text. In the "International
Convention for Unification of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading,"
signed at Brussels August 25, 1924, the idea of due diligence has been introduced through the expression "diligence raisonnable" (see Art. 3 paragraph
1 and Art. 4 paragraph 1 of the Convention).38 And it will be seen that the
meaning of
very same phrase was used by the rapporteur in explaining the
3 9
the expression "les mesures raisonnables" in the Paris draft.
The words "les mesures raisonnables" were retained in the various draft
conventions worked out by CITEJA40 in the years following the Paris Conference 1925, and they appeared also in the draft submitted to the Warsaw
Conference in October 1929 (see Art. 22 of the draft).41 In his explanation
to the Conference of the provisions of liability contained in the draift
convention, the Rapporteur, M. de Vos, repeated in all essentials the observations made by M. Pittard in his report of 1925.4
The Soviet Union, however, had submitted to the Conference a proposal
of amendment to the effect that the words "toutes les mesures necessaires"
be substituted for the expression "les mesures raisonnables. ' 4s This proposal
was classified by the preparatory commission-in which also a Russian
delegate had a seat44--as a "question de redaction. ' 45 Accordingly, it was not
touched upon during the extensive discussions concerning the principles of
liability ("questions de fond de premi4re importance"), nor during the
examination of "les questions de fond de deuxi6me importance. ' 46 At the
third and last reading of the draft convention the words "les mesures
raisonnables" were still to be found in the new Art. 20 (former Art. 22).47
At that time the Russian delegate pointed out that it had been decidedpresumably in the drafting committee-to insert the expression "toutes les
mesures necessaires" in substitution for "les mesures raisonnables." The
acting Rapporteur agreed, and no other comments being made, the Article
48
was adopted in the proposed form.
Thus it appears unquestionable that the replacement of the words "les
mesures raisonnables" with "toutes les mesures necessaires" at the Warsaw
Conference was a drafting matter only. Although the U.S.S.R. was generally
in favor of making the air carrier's liability more stringent, 49 there can be

8
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no doubt that the amendment did not intend to touch upon the substance of
the system of liability-and was not understood by the Conference to do so,
either. The little attention paid to it bear witness thereof. In other words:
The interpretation of the expression "toutes les mesures necessaires" must
be made in close conformity with the idea behind "les mesures raisonnables"
as described in M. Pittard's report of 1925. This is the only conclusion to
be drawn from the genesis of the present Art. 20.
b. National Implementation Acts
The various national Acts implementing the Warsaw Convention contain
in general either the same expressions as Art. 20 or a verbatim translation
thereof. In some cases, however, it is possible to find expressions in these
Acts indicating, to a certain degree, the legislator's understanding of the
words "all necessary measures." Thus the Danish, the Norwegian, the
Swedish and the Finnish implementation Acts are all referring to the notion
of fault instead of "all necessary measures" (the carrier is not liable if the
damage has not been caused by fault).50 The German text of the Warsaw
Convention makes use of the expression "erforderlichen Massnahmen" and
not "notwendigen Massnahmen" which would have been the direct translation of the original text.5 1 These examples illustrate the difficulties of the
various legislators in transforming the original expression into workable
legal terms in the various languages; in all of them an attempt has been
made to avoid the objective elements which a literal understanding of the
52
word "necessary" involves.
c. Revision Works
A relatively short time after the coming into force of the Warsaw Convention the question of its revision arose, and Art. 20 was numbered among
the Articles requiring amendments. The expression "all necessary measures"
had created difficulties and uncertainty when applied in practice and different interpretations had been advanced. Therefore, efforts were made to
substitute the words with another expression less susceptible to divergent
interpretations. "Les mesures raisonnables,"5 3 "toutes mesures utiles et
normales, ' '5 4 "all proper measures," 55 "all prudent measures," 56 "all possible
and foreseeable measures," 57 "appropriate measures,"58 "all necessary and
possible measures" 59 were among the terms suggested in the different phases
of the revision work on the Convention.00 And all of them were intended to
express the principle which formed the basis of the system of liability laid
down by the Warsaw Convention: the duty to show due diligence-or to
act as a bonus pater familias.
Art. 20 was not changed, however, at The Hague Conference in 1955.
The Article was discussed at some length, 61 especially in connection with a
Dutch-Norwegian-Australian proposal of amendment which substituted the
word "negligence" for the expression "all necessary measures" (the carrier
not to be liable if the damage was not caused by negligence).62 The discussions showed that the vast majority of the delegates considered Art. 20
paragraph 1 to indicate a liability based on the principle of fault.63 But a
tendency towards a more stringent interpretation of the words "all necessary
measures" was found, also. Thus the delegate of The Federal Republic of
Germany, while commenting on the above-mentioned proposal, stated inter
alia that
"1... the existing text (of Art. 20 paragraph 1) required all necessary
measures to be taken, while the Netherlands Delegation only wished to
accept liability in the case where there was fault on the part of the pilot
or carrier. But, one could very well say objectively: such and such measures would have been necessary, but the pilot could not be blamed for not
having taken these measures, because it was necessary for him to reach
a quick decision and he did not have sufficient time to comply with these
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measures. Consequently, there would be no fault on the part of the pilot,
although (objectively, it would have been possible for him to64have taken
the measures if he had understood the situation right away."
It will be seen that an interpretation along these lines is not in conformity with the intentions of the draftsmen of the Convention (see supra
p. 6-8).
Also the United States delegate feared that the proposal including the
introduction of the notion of negligence could 'be held to have attenuated the
carrier's liability pursuant to the present Art. 20 paragraph 1.65
Although many of the delegates seemed to consider the words "all necessary measures" a not very satisfactory expression of the underlying principle of liability of Art. 20, the present text was retained, apparently for
lack of any better wording. Furthermore, the question of the requirements
to satisfy the carrier's burden of proof was discussed simultaneously with
this problem which complicated the issue considerably.
d. Authors
Also, the overwhelming majority of the authors has construed "all necessary measures" as including a requirement for the exercising of due dili66
gence-or the diligence of a bonus pater familias, see for example Ripert,
67
68
69
70
71
7
2
7
Coquoz, Giannini, Ambrosini, Lemoine, Riese, Beaumont, Picard,3
Chauveau,74 Litvine,75 Salinas,7 6 Schweickhardt77 and Perucchi.78 The same
view has also been expressed by stating that "all necessary measures" are
equivalent to "reasonable measures," see Goedhuis,7 9 Shaweross and Beaumont, 80 and McNair,8 1 or that the carrier is not liable when no fault has been
committed, Ripert,8 2 Maschino,8 3 Sack,s4 Lupton,8 5 Schleicher-Reymann8 6 and
87
Knauth.
Moller says that "in effect the carrier in regard to passengers will be
liable for little more than negligence if he has taken reasonable measures to
provide for the safety of the person carried."88 It does not appear quite clear
what the meaning is behind this statement.
Koffka-Bodenstein-Koffka seems to hold an opinion differing from that
of the majority by stating that "the carrier must . . . prove . . that all
measures objectively required for the avoidance of the damage have been
taken."89 According to such an interpretation the diligence to be exercised
is not only that of a bonus pater familias, but that of a vir optimus. 90
Finally, Astle writes that the substitution of the word "reasonable" for
"necessary" in the United Kingdom Order of Council 1952 is an alteration
concerning "the onus of proof upon the carrier in order to gain immunity
for loss or damage occasioned to cargo." 91 This seems to indicate a distinction of substance between the words in question.
e. Court Decisions
The courts of several countries have been faced with the problem of
interpretation of the words "all necessary measures." The question was
examined extensively in the Italian case Palleroni vs. S.A. di Navigazione
Aeria, Corte di Cassazione, March 31, 1938 :92 Fire breaking out in a hydroplane during its landing on the sea, forced all the passengers to plunge into
the water whereby one of them perished. The next of kin sought compensation from the Air Company and the question arose whether "all necessary
measures" to avoid the damage had been taken or had been impossible to
take. The lower court, having !examined the preparatory works of Art. 20
paragraph 1, had made a distinction between "the reasonable measures"
and "all necessary measures" to the effect that the former expression indicated a more subjective standard of care than the latter which must be
considered more objective and universal in its requirements to the carrier.
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Corte di Cassazione, however, rejected these considerations. The Court
stated that the system of liability contained in the text was the following:
"Presumption of liability against the carrier; recognition of exemption
from liability even in cases other than those of force majeure and cas
fortuit; the proof exempting the carrier . . . consisting in showing that
he and-his servants or agents have taken the necessary measures to avoid
the accident. The presumption of liability . . . should flow from the omission of the diligence expected of an ordinary man, that is, of bonus pater
familias, for the following reasons: (a) the diligence of the ordinary man
is the rule which governs, in principle, the fulfilments of all contracts ...
(b) the text contains no allusion or reference to diligence of a different
degree . . . Consequently, when it is necessary to establish concretely
whether the carrier has taken the necessary measures to avoid the accident, the nature of the measures required and the necessity of such nature
for the object sought by the law must be determined in relation to the
measures which the normal and well-regulated carrier would have adopted
and to the necessity which such carrier would have seen. One cannot go
any further."
It will be seen that the judgment describes the required standard of care
in accordance with the principles advanced in Pittard's report of 1925. 9 3The difficulties of interpretation of the words "all necessary measures"
are well illustrated by a comparison of the following two cases. In the
French case Csillag vs. Air France, Tribunal civil de Toulouse, February 10,
1938, it was stated that
".... in order to exonerate himself the carrier has not to prove that he
and his servants or agents have committed no faults, it being sufficient for
him to show-as said the delegate M. Pittard94 -that he has exercised
the diligence of a bonus pater familias and has taken all the reasonable
and normal measures to avoid the damage ... 95
However, in a judgment given by Tribunale di Tripoli, August 14, 1937,
in the case Primatestavs. Ala Littoria,96 the Court stated that the carrier
had to prove not only that no fault was committed but also that he and his
servants or agents had taken all necessary measures or that it had been
97
impossible for them to take such measures.
While the French Court apparently held the proof that all necessary
measures have been taken to be a less burdensome proof than that which
shows that no fault has been committed, the opposite seems to be true as far
as the judgment from Tripoli is concerned. Bearing in mind the intention
of the draftsmen of Art. 20-according to which the liability was to be
based on fault--one will see that both decisions fail to hit the meaning of
the original idea behind the Article.In the English case Grein vs. Imperial Airways Ltd., King's Bench Division, October 23, 1935, Court of Appeal, July 13, 1936,98 the meaning of
"all necessary measures" was also discussed, and in this regard Green L. J.
stated:
... the carrier . . . is not to be liable if he proves that by his agents
or servants he exercised all reasonable skill and care in taking all necessary measures to avoid causing damage by accident to the passenger or
proves that it was impossible to take such measures. This seems to me to
amount to a promise not to injure the passenger by avoidable accident, the
onus being on the carrier to prove that the accident could not have been
avoided by exercise of reasonable care .. .99
In the American case Ritts vs. American Overseas Airlines, United
States District Court, Southern District of New York, January 17-18,
1949,100 the judge instructed the jury that "a very high degree of care is
required of an air carrier to protect its passengers from injury and death."
And later the jury was asked: "Has the defendant (the carrier) proved ...
that the defendant and its agents took all reasonable and necessary measures
to avoid the damage?"
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Another case in which the problem was examined is American Smelting
and Refining Company vs. Philippine Airlines Inc., United States, Supreme
Court of New York County, June 21, 1954,101 where it was stated:
"The proof adduced upon the trial conclusively establishes that defendant took all possible precautions to insure the safety of the flight and to
avoid the crash of its aircraft."
In the case Pierre vs. Eastern Air Lines et al., United States District
Court, District of New Jersey, January 27, 1957,102 the Court stated that the
carrier must pay unless it can prove "that it and its servants were free from
all fault."
It appears that the Courts in the above quoted cases have found themselves obliged to paraphrase the expression "all necessary measures" when
applying Art. 20, and most of them have used terms which are revolving
around the idea of fault; to the contrary, however, is the case from Tripoli.
In the French case from Toulouse a distinction has been made, it is true,
between proof of the diligence of a bonus pater familias and proof of absence
of fault. But the real problem behind this distinction is the one concerning
103
the requirements to satisfy the carrier's burden of proof.
Summarizing the examination of the meaning of the expression of Art. 20
paragraph 1 that the carrier must prove that he and his servants or agents
"have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him and them to take such measures," the following can be stated:
The intention behind the original wording including the expression "the reasonable measures" was to introduce the principle that the carrier, his servants
or agents, have to show due diligence-to act with the care of a bonus pater
familias. In other words, the liability was based on fault. At the Warsaw
Conference the expression was changed to "all necessary measures," but the
principle behind the terminology remained unchanged. During the revision
work on the Convention almost all statement gave expression to a meaning
of these words in conformity with the original idea behind them. Also
certain national Acts which have paraphrased Art. 20 paragraph 1 when
implementing the Convention, have expressed themselves along these lines.
An overwhelming majority of authors has held the same views, and the
courts of several countries have approved this interpretation.
2. THE REQUIREMENTS TO SATISFY THE BURDEN OF PROOF IMPOSED
UPON THE CARRIER IN ARTICLE 20 PARAGRAPH 1
The consensus of opinion which, on the whole, is prevailing among the
courts and writers of different countries concerning the interpretation of
Art. 20 paragraph 1 with regard to the expression "all necessary measures,"
comes to an abrupt end, however, as soon as the question turns upon the
requirements to satisfy the carrier'sburden of proof that all necessary measures have been taken or were impossible to take. That is the reason why the
discussions concerning Art. 20 paragraph 1, while taking their starting point
in the incertitude of interpretation of the words "all necessary measures,"
usually have merged into a debate about the requirements to satisfy the onus
of the carrier.10 4 This is the main problem with respect to the interpretation
of Art. 20 paragraph 1, and it stands out, above all, in cases of unknown cause
of damage. For the more the factual circumstances are unexplained, the
more significant is the r8le played by the burden of proof. No wonder then
that these cases have been les enfants terribles in the interpretation of
Art. 20 paragraph 1.
The problem and the different approaches to its solution will be better
illustrated, it is believed, by outlining the views and arguments put forward
by various authors dealing with this question. The vast majority of authors
groups itself around certain chief points of view which will be expounded
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below. After that, the preparatory works of the Warsaw Convention with
respect to the present Art. 20 paragraph 1 will be studied-the more so as
these works have often played a decisive r6le in the attitude of the courts
and authors to the problem. In that connection the revision works on the
Convention and the discussions during The Hague Conference 1955 will also
be studied. Finally, the court decisions will be examined.
a. Authors
A number of authors has advocated a so-called liberal interpretation
of Art. 20 paragraph 1 in respect of the requirements for the fulfilment 1of
05
the carrier's burden of proof. As an exponent for this approach Lemoine
may be mentioned. According to this author the carrier has to furnish proof
to the effect that he and his servants or agents have exercised due diligence
in the execution of their duties, but this proof has to be furnished only
within the possibilities allowed by the circumstances of the case in question.
It does not rest unconditionally with the carrier to explain the cause of
damage or to trace the entire chain of events leading up to the damage in
order to show that all necessary measures have been taken up to the very
last moment. Only to the extent to which the circumstances permit him to
do so, the carrier has to furnish such proof. Otherwise, it will be sufficient
for him to furnish a more general proof of the due diligence of his crew.
In that case he will have to prove that all required measures aiming at a
safe flight have been taken, for example that the aircraft in question was
airworthy; that all state regulations concerning the exploitation of the
aircraft have been observed strictly; that the aircraft has been kept in good
order and has been carefully overhauled; that at the moment of departure
the aircraft was carrying sufficient fuel and oil; that the crew was well
equipped and possessed the necessary licenses; that the departure did not
take place under weather conditions in which a prudent carrier would have
postponed the departure..
Support for this interpretation of Art. 20 paragraph 1 is, above all,
derived from the preparatory works of the Convention, and in this respect
Lemoine cites the following passage from Pittard's report of 1925:106
"Que peut-on exiger du transport a6rien? Une organisation normale
de son exploitation, un choix judicieux de son personnel, une surveillance
constante de ses agents et proposes, un10 contr61e
s~rieux de ses appareils
7
accessoires et des mati~res employ6es."'
This text does not impose upon the carrier-the author states-the obligation of explaining the origin of the accident in order to show that no
fault has been committed in connection with every event leading up to the
accident. In particular, the text does not require the carrier to trace all the
acts of the crew in order to prove that nothing wrong has been done, and
that everything that could be required according to the circumstances has
been carried out. A requirement to that effect would mean that the carrier
had to reconstruct the accident in order to analyze every phase. In general
it is impossible, however, to furnish the negative proof of non-existence of
fault. Accordingly, a liberal interpretation 'has to be adopted-that is the
08
only one compatible with the above cited report.
An understanding of Art. 20 paragraph 1 along these lines has been held2
10 9
Giannini,"o Lacombe,"' Picard,"
by several authors, thus Miller,
11
6
Lefebvre d'Ovidio and Pescatore, Chauveau,114 Lena Paz,115 Rabut,"1
and
Litvine.117
In an examination of the draft convention drawn up in Paris 1925which relieved the carrier of liability in the cases of nautic faults of his
servants or agents in respect of passengers also-Ripert'5 has stated that
the carrier was able to avoid liability even if the origin of damage be
unknown. If the carrier showed that no faults have been committed before
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the departure and that the crew was qualified and duly licensed, nothing
further was required. 119
A few years after the Warsaw Conference, however, Ripert confines
himself to point out that behind the liability provisions of the Convention
the Anglo-Saxon idea of due diligence is to be found. 120 The carrier has to
show that he has committed no fault, and in England this question is left
to the estimation of the court. Ripert seems to hold a general proof sufficient
in this respect, but does not mention either the responsibility
for servants
121
or agents or the case of unknown cause of damage.
Goedhuis 22 has put forward an interpretation of Art. 20 in which, it is
true, he takes his starting point quite opposite to Lemoine, but the result
of which in practice will be close to that of the liberal interpretation. Originally-Goedhuis says-the intention behind the liability provisions of the
Convention with regard to servants or agents was to hold the carrier liable
on the basis of "faute de surveillance" only, and not in general for faults
committed by his employees. 28 This opinion is based on Pittard's report of
1925, and once more the passage commencing with the words "Que pout-on
exiger . . ." is quoted.

24

At a later stage, however, the carrier's liability

was made more stringent, the carrier now being held liable towards passengers in cases of nautic faults on the part of his servants or agents. 25
Accordingly, pursuant to the present Art. 20 the carrier has to prove that
both he and his servants or agents have taken all the necessary measures to
avoid the damage. And the author continues:
"But if the cause is unknown what proof has to be given then by the
carrier? As a direct proof is impossible, the carrier must be allowed 126
to
prove by presumption that his agents took the necessary measures.
If the carrier shows that the crew held the necessary certificates, he must
be relieved from his liability unless the plaintiff rebuts the presumption
by evidence to the contrary. The Court when applying the rules of the
Warsaw Convention should bear in mind that the fundamental idea of
Art. 20 is to relieve the carrier of his liability when he has committed no
fault.
The fact of imposing upon the carrier the burden of proving affirmatively that his agents took the necessary measures, would mean imposing
an absolute liability upon him in cases where the cause of the accident
remains unknown .

.

. (But) the authors of the Convention unanimously

rejected a liability of the air carrier based on the theory of risk."127

This opinion has also been shared by a substantial number of authors,
for example Ambrosini 28 Marino,129 (perhaps) Coquoz,130 van Houtte,1"'
(perhaps) Gay de Montella,132 Sandoval,1"' Salinas"4 and Tapia.1" 5
Schweickhardt5 6 holds an opinion which seems to lead to a somewhat
similar result. He states that the carrier has to prove that due diligence was
exercised in connection with all the specific circumstances of the accident to
which knowledge can be obtained. This interpretation takes into consideration the fact that air accidents are often inexplicable and, accordingly, no
strict proof ought to be required either with regard to the cause of accident
or as far as the exercising of due care is concerned. In such cases it must
be sufficient to furnish the exonerating proof by means of the establishment
of a probability based upon the normal development of the events of
accidents.
A more restrictive tendency in the interpretation of the requirements
to satisfy the carrier's burden of proof has been expressed by Riese:'87 In
cases of unknown cause of accident the carrier has the possibility of proving
that he himself and his servants or agents on the ground have taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage. But how can he show that the
crew has exercised due diligence-especially if all persons on board the
aircraft have perished in the accident? In such a case no presumption exists
either for negligence or for non-negligence on the part of the crew, and it
is inconsistent with the allocation of the burden of proof in Art. 20 to put
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forward a presumption to the effect that a duly licensed and qualified crew
has taken all necessary measures. Nor can the view held by Lemoine, according to which a general proof of due diligence on the part of the crew is
considered sufficient in cases of unknown cause of damage, be accepted.
That would be an evasion of the burden of proof imposed upon the carrier.
Riese admits, however, that the circumstances may justify the presumption
that the crew has taken all necessary measures, in particular if the accident
is most probably due to force majeure;1 s in that case-the author addsthere is, however, no further question of an unknown cause of accident.
Also, the carrier may escape liability if he is able to point out all possible
causes under consideration and proves that no fault has been committed in
connection with any of these possibilities. 3 9 However, in the case of a fully
unexplained cause of damage the carrier cannot furnish the exonerating
proof.
Several writers have expressed views, more or less detailed, along
40
Sullivan,'4 1 Schleicher,142
the same lines, thus Koffka-Bodenstein-Koffka,
44
148
Achtnich145 and Drion.146
(apparently) Sauveplanne,
Oppikofer,
Also Abraham' 47 holds the opinion that lack of knowledge of the origin
of the damage ( a "non liquet") will entail the liability of the carrier. This
conclusion is based upon an examination of the existing court decisions on
the question, and it is pointed out that this interpretation corresponds to
48
the prevailing views in maritime law.
Calkins has given expression to the same views by stating that "frequently a non-negligent defendant (carrier) will be held liable because of
complete absence of proof to exculpate himself."' 49 And the author continues:
"... in a certain number of situations, of which the Grand Canyon
accident" 50 may be typical, the law becomes stalled on dead center because
of total absence of proof. Society-particularly the air traveling part of it
-owes a self-interested obligation to see that in such circumstances the
individual does not lose out."
Finally, some authors, although not touching upon the unknown cause
of damage directly, have expressed themselves concerning the carrier's
possibilities of furnishing the proof required in Art. 20. Hernandez'51 holds
the view that this proof is very easily established, while Maschino," 2
Schleicher-Reymann,153 Sune Wetter, 54 and Francais"55 on the other hand
consider it very difficult for the carrier to satisfy the requirements of Art.
20. The latter opinion is also expressed ,byKnauth156 who seems to place it
on an equal footing with proof of force majeure.
The examination of the viewpoints of the authors has revealed differences
of opinion to a large extent with regard to the requirements to satisfy the
carrier's burden of proof pursuant to Art. 20 paragraph 1. Above all, the
schism stands out in cases of completely, or almost completely, unknown
cause of damage in which the court will have (almost) no evidence at all
to build upon when considering the questions concerning the crew's due
diligence and the efficiency of the measures taken by the carrier's ground
staff to secure a safe flight. Is a general proof consisting in furnishing the
relevant licenses, certificates etc. to be considered satisfactory proof of the
due care of the servants or agents in such cases? The partisans of an
answer in the affirmative have first of all derived support for their interpretation of Art. 20 paragraph 1 from the preparatory works of the Convention, and in the following these works will be examined.
b. PreparatoryWorks
As previously mentioned the origin of the present Art. 20 of the Warsaw
Convention is to be found in the draft convention drawn up by the First
International Conference on Private Air Law in Paris 1925.157 Art. 5 and
6 ran as follows:
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Article 5: "Le transporteur est responsable des accidents, pertes,
avaries et retards. 11 n'est pas responsable s'il prouve avoir pris les
mesures raisonnables pour 6viter le dommage; cette preuve est admise
m~me dans le cas ofl le dommage provient d'un vice propre de l'appareil."
Article 6: "Le transporteur r6pond des fautes commises par ses pr6poses. Toutefois, en cas de faute de navigation, le transporteur ne sera
15
pas responsable s'il fait la preuve h l'article precedent."
In his report of 1925, also earlier referred to, Pittard has expounded
these provisions as follows:
"La Commission s'est demand~e quel r6gime de responsabilit6 il fallait
adopter: risque ou faute. L'opinion g~n~rale est que, tandis que la responsabilit6 civile
l'Agard des tiers, doit comporter l'application de la th~orie
du risque, en revanche, dans la responsabilit6 du transporteur i l'gard
des passagers et des marchandises, il faut admettre la th~orie de la faute.
Ce premier point acquis, on peut se demander & qui incombe le fardeau
de la preuve; il a paru 6quitable de ne pas imposer cette lourde charge au
ls6 et l'on a admis la pr~somption de faute A la charge du transporteur.
Mais comme ce n'est qu'une pr~somption, le transporteur a 6videmment
le droit de rapporter la preuve contraire et l'on doit alors 6tablir nettement
la limite de la faute; ofi commence celle-ci?
Que peut-on exiger du transport adrien? Une organisation normale de
son exploitation, un choix judicieux de son personnel, une surveillance
constante de ses agents et propos6s, un contr6le s6rieux de ses appareils
accessoires et des matifres employ6es.
I1 faut bien admettre que celui qui utilise un a~ronef n'ignore pas les
risques inhrents h un mode de circulation qui n'a pas encore atteint le
point de perfection que cent ann~es ont donn6 aux chemins de fer. I1 est
donc juste de ne pas imposer au transporteur une responsabilit6 absolue
et de le d~gager de toute responsabilit6 lorsqu'il a pris les mesures
raisonnables et normales pour 6viter le dommage; c'est la diligence que
l'on peut exiger du bon pre de famille.
P'lus delicate encore est la question de la responsabilitk du transporteur
pour ses proposes.
Le texte qui vous est soumis comporte l'application de deux principes.
Le premier est d'une application g~n~rale, A savoir que le maitre r6pond
des actes de ses prepos6s; le second, d~ji retenu pour la responsabilite du
transporteur, c'est qu'il n'y a pas -de responsabilit6 sans faute, celle-ci
6tant pr~sum~e jusqu'A preuve rapportke de la diligence raisonnable.
On peut se demander si la responsabilitk du transporteur ne se trouve
pas ainsi plus 6tendue en ce qui touche les proposes que pour lui-m~me;
mais c'est 1U une simple apparence. En effet, dans les deux cas, il n'y a de
responsabilitk que s'il y a faute ou plus exactement si la faute pr~sum6e
n'a pas kt annul~e par la preuve que les mesures raisonnables ont t6
prises pour 6viter le dommage; mais, tant que cette preuve n'est pas
rapport~e, la pr~somption de faute subsiste et le maitre 59
est responsable
aussi bien du fait de ses pr6poses que des siens propres."'
Several authors have referred to the passage commencing with the words
"Que peut-on exiger . . ." to support the interpretation according to which
the carrier need not explain the cause of damage in order to satisfy the
requirements for his burden of proof. This is true both in respect of authors
putting forward a liberal interpretation of Art. 20160 and of those taking a
restrictive interpretation as their starting point but permitting a presumption to the effect that due diligence has been shown when the circumstances
16
do not render a direct proof possible. '

It is correct that the passage referred to does not impose upon the
carrier the obligation to prove that up to the moment of damage no faults
have been committed by the crew. But this does not justify the conclusion
that a "general" proof of-or a presumption of-the diligence of the crew
is sufficient or permissible when the circumstances render a direct proof
impossible. Pittard's report must be read in its entirety. Then it will be
seen that the quoted passage concerns the carrier's liability in respect of his
own acts only (Art. 5 of the draft). The question of the carrier's responsibility with regard to faults committed by his servants or agents-including
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the crew-(Art. 6), is only dealt with further down in the report, viz. from
the passage beginning with the words "Plus d4licate encore est la question
de la responsabilit6 du transporteur pour ses proposes. . ." And in that part
of the report nothing is said which could be taken in support of a liberal
interpretation of Art. 20 or of a presumption to the above mentioned effect.
In fact, the report, in exposing the principles of liability of the draft convention, does not seem to touch at all upon the specific question of the
requirements to satisfy the carrier's burden of proof. The report states that
the system of liability is based upon fault; that the burden of proof ("cette
lourde charge")162 is imposed on the carrier, that the carrier is liable for
the faults of his servants or agents, that he can escape liability by proving
that he and they have taken all reasonable measures, and, finally, that an
exception from this system of liability has been admitted to the effect that
the carrier is not held liable for the nautical faults of his crew. But nothing
has been stated which could serve as a guide with regard to the question of
how to furnish the proof required.
During the further discussions in CITEJA on the proposed convention
the question of liability was not dealt with in detail until the Third Session
in Madrid, May 1928.1 03 In his report to the Committee the rapporteur,
M. Henry de Vos, Belgium, referred extensively to Pittard's earlier report
of 1925 with regard to the principles of liability. 6 4 The German delegation,
however, wanted the air carrier's liability to be more stringent and proposed
therefore principally to delete the provision according to which the carrier
might escape liability in cases of nautic faults on the part of his servants or
agents, and in the alternative-as a compromise-that the provision should
cover carriage of goods and baggage only. 65 The Committee adopted the
alternative proposal and at the same time another amendment was approved
according to which the carrier could never escape liability if latent defect
in the aircraft was proved.' 66 In the new draft convention Art. 22 was drawn
67
up accordingly.
At the Warsaw Conference in October 1929 a new report, dated September 25, 1928,168 was presented by M. de Vos-once more rapporteur. Again
reference was made to Pittard's report of 1925169 with regard to the principles of liability of the draft convention. The only changes were the Madrid
amendments the reasons for which were explained in the report.
During the discussions in Warsaw two opposite trends manifested themselves with respect to the principles of liability, and an extensive exchange
of views took place. 17o According to one opinion the air carrier ought to be
responsible for all faults committed by his servants or agents, including
nautical faults in the carriage of goods and baggage. Other delegates held
an opposite view. They proposed to exempt the carrier from being held liable
in all cases of nautic faults committed by his servants or agents, and
furthermore to delete the strict liability for latent defects in the aicraft. 171
As a compromise between these views the present Art. 20 was drawn up.
The question concerning the requirements to satisfy the carrier's burden
of proof pursuant to Art. 20 was, however, touched upon by implication
only. Examining the proposal for the compromise from which the existing
Art. 20 emanated, the French delegate M. Fladin stated:
"... en fait on peut classer les accidents d'avions en trois cat6gories:
ceux qui proviennent d'une faute de pilotage; ceux qui proviennent d'un
vice de fonctionnement de l'appareil et ceux qui sont d6sign4s comme 6tant
le r6sultat du cas fortuit, ce qui est la majorit6 des cas.
Si nous adoptons la formule transactionnelle, en ce qui concerne les
premiers cas, ceux qui r~sultent d'une faute de pilotage, ily aura responsabilit4 du transporteur, mais pour les passagers seulement. Pour les autres,
ceux qui proviendraient du vice de fonctionnement de l'appareil, ilest bien
entendu qu'il n'y aurait aucune responsabilit6 du transporteur.
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Quant bt la troisidme cat~gorie d'accidents, ceux qui proviennent du cas
fortuit, dds maintenant, par le
172jeu de la convention, le transporteur est
toujours d~clar6 responsable."'
The last remark is surprising. By a number of authors from the Civil
Code countries it has been stated that the liability pursuant to Art. 20
paragraph 1 is less burdensome to the carrier than the contractual liability
in the Civil Codes 173 according to which the contract-debtor has to prove
that the non-execution of the contract was due to "force majeure" or "cas
fortuit.'1 74 M. Fladin's statement might indicate very strict requirements
for the fulfilment of the carrier's burden of proof. But no grounds having
been given nor any further explanation, the statement seems not to be sufficiently elaborated to form a basis from which support may be derived for
a certain interpretation of Art. 20 paragraph 1.
During the examination of "les questions de fond de deuxi~me importance" the question was also raised indirectly by the Japanese delegate,
M. Motono. At M. Motono's request the rapporteur explained the meaning
of the then Art. 22, and the following exchange of words took place:
"M. de Vos . . . : I1y a les mesures raisonnables que peut prendre le
transporteur et ily a les mesures que peut prendre le pilote.
M. Motono ... : Qu'est-ce que vous entendez par "mesures raisonnables"?
M. de Vos .. .: Cette expression qui a un sens plus precis en GrandeBretagne que sur le Continent, sera interpr~t~e par le juge suivant chaque
cas.
M. Motono. .. : Est-ce que vous entendez dire que le fait de prendre
un pilote capable suffit?
M. de Vos . . . : C'est une question d'interpr~tation. Le 1comit6
de
75
redaction pourra peut-6tre pr6ciser le sens de cette expression."'
No definition or clarification, however, seems to have been given during the
Conference.
The examination of the preparatory works of the Convention seems to
justify the conclusion that no support can be derived from these works for
a specific interpretation of Art. 20 paragraph 1 in one or another direction
in respect of the question concerning the requirements to satisfy the burden
of proof imposed upon the carrier. The only answer to be found in the
preparatory works appears to be the above quoted: "It is a matter of
interpretation"!
c. Implementation Acts and Domestic Carriageby Air Acts
Turning once again to the national implementation Acts it will be seen
that in respect of the problem now under discussion, they do not give much
guidance, either. By reproducing the original text literally they just take
over the problem without indicating any approach to its solution. Once
again, however, the Scandinavian and the Finnish Acts178 constitute exceptions. In these Acts the Articles corresponding to Art. 20 paragraph 1 of
the Convention run as follows:
"The carrier is not liable if it is proved that the damage is not caused
by his fault or that of his servants or agents ...,177
With a wording along these lines the requirements to satisfy the carrier's
burden of proof have been specified through the requirement for proof to
the effect that the damage was not caused by faults. Thereby the explanation
of the cause of damage has been given a leading part in the exculpating
178
proof.
It is worth noting, however, that in the Danish proposal for a new Aviation Act, 1'7 9 in which the Warsaw rules as amended by The Hague Protocol
of 1955 are included, a literal translation of Art. 20 paragraph 1 has replaced
the above quoted text. The change of wording has been explained in the
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proposal by a short statement to the effect that the new text is closer to
that of the Convention than the existing one. This approximation to the
text of the Convention seems to be an advantage. For the sake of the
ultimate purpose behind the Convention: the unification of law, the national
implementation Acts should follow the wording of the original text as
closely as possible. Interpretation of the Convention rests with the courts,
not with the national legislator.
In some cases even the domestic carriage by air Acts and their preparatory works may give expression to a certain understanding of Art. 20
paragraph 1 of the Convention. This is true with respect to the recent Acts
of France and Australia. In France the Act of March 2, 1957, concerning
the air carrier's liability 18 o has introduced, by way of a general reference
to the Convention, the Warsaw rules into the French legislation governing
non-Warsaw carriage, thus superseding the earlier Art. 41, 42, 43 and 48
of the French Act of May 31, 1924.181 In Art. 6 of the Bill presented by the
French Government in 1955, however, the carrier's defenses in Art. 20
paragraph 1 and Art. 21 of the Convention were paraphrased into: "force
majeure," "vice propre A la chose transport6e," and "une faute imputable
au voyageur, A l'expediteur ou au destinataire," and the following explanatory statement was added:
"L'article 6 substitue aux dispositions de l'article 20 paragraph 1 de
Convention de Varsovie des regles mieux adapt~es aux concepts juridiques
francais et dont les r~sultats practiques ne devraient pas 6tre sensiblement
diff~rents de ceux recommand~s par le texte international ... "182
This seems to indicate a very restrictive interpretation of Art. 20 paragraph 1. Yet, in the present French Act of March 2, 1957, no paraphrasing
or explanation of Art. 20 paragraph 1 is to be found.
In the Australian Civil Aviation (Carrier's Liability) Act No. 2 of 1959,
an even more restrictive understanding of Art. 20 paragraph 1 has resulted
in its deletion altogether as far as domestic carriage of passengers is concerned, see Part IV Section 28 of the Act, (but for the opposite, see Section
29 concerning baggage). In presenting the Bill to the Senate, the Minister
for Shipping and Transport and Minister for Civil Aviation ('Senator
Paltridge) stated in respect of Art. 20 of the Warsaw Convention:
"The onus of proof is on the carrier, and it is certainly a very narrow
defense since, in most foreseeable cases, if the carrier 'takes all necessary
measures to avoid the damage,' the accident would not have occurred.
83
The carrier is strictly liable up to a prescribed limit of 7.400 pounds
in respect of death or injury of a passenger, unless he successfully sets
up the narrow defense provided in Art. 20 . . . Experience under the
international rules indicates that the carrier has rarely sought to establish -this defense and that it would be most difficult to do so successfully.
However, it does introduce an element of uncertainty as to passengers'
rights and for domestic ' 1purposes
it is, therefore, proposed to deprive the
carrier of this defense. 8 4

Other Senators 'held concurring views, 8 5 and in reply to the only one
expressing doubt as to the understanding advanced on Art. 20186 the
Minister said:
".... In fact, the defense is so narrow that the Convention is regarded
internationally as imposing absolute liability .. ,,187
The expressions of doubt seem, however, to have been well-founded considering these categorical statements!
d. Revision Works and The Hague Conference 1955
While the problem of the requirements to satisfy the carrier's burden
of proof was touched upon only lightly and indirectly at the Warsaw Con-
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ference 1929, it has been discussed at considerable length during the revision
works on the Convention and at The Hague Conference in 1955. Being a
problem of great practical importance it had presented itself several times
in the application of Art. 20 paragraph 1 and had soon caused conflicting
court decisions as well as conflicting opinions among writers.
During the meeting of the Second Commission of CITEJA in Paris,
January 1939, the problem was discussed in connection with a British
memorandum concerning the revision of the Warsaw Convention, dated
September 28, 1938,188 in which the British points of view were exposed
as follows:
"... According to the Convention the carrier has to show not only that
it itself has taken all necessary measures, but it must also prove the same
as to its servants . . .including the pilot of the aircraft. It is notorious
that most flying accidents are caused by some default or other of the
human element; in any event, it is certain that the majority of accidents
can be attributed directly or indirectly to some act or omission of the
personnel. Considering that in a great number of cases the pilot is himself
killed in the accident, it will be understood that the carrier rarely has the
opportunity to bear the burden of proof imposed on him by the Convention."
The attitude of the United States delegation to the meeting is reflected
in the following passage:
"... It has been asked whether, in the sense of the Convention, the
carrier may be freed from his liability for what have commonly been
called the 'risks of the air' (as provided in the French Air Law of May
31, 1924), or if the Convention establishes a presumption of liability which
the carrier cannot overcome unless he can prove that the accident was
inevitable from the practical point of view.
We suggest that the former proposal is fair; but the results conform
to the latter."'1 9
After the second world war CITEJA resumed its activities and the
revision of the Warsaw Convention was among the first subjects for its
studies. In a questionnaire containing nineteen questions of principle and
distributed during the meeting of the Second Commission of CITEJA, July
1946,190 question no. XV ran as follows:
"Shall the carrier be responsible in all cases of fault on the part of his
servants or agents, and what proof is to be furnished when the aircraft
has disappeared with the whole crew?"
Few of the experts from the various States seem to have answered this
9
question. In the reply from the Greek expert' ' it was said that, perhaps, in
to prove the non-existence of
be
allowed
should
carrier
the
difficult cases,
fault on the part of his servants or agents by a presumption to this effect.
The Egyptian expert' 92 thought it equitable to make it possible for the
carrier to prove, in the case in question, that it was impossible for him to
avoid the damage. The Dutch delegation' 93 suggested to reconsider an earlier
proposal from IATA 94 to the effect that if the circumstances render it
impossible for the carrier to prove that all the measures have been taken,
the absence of circumstances and facts constituting a presumption of fault
on the part of his servants or agents should be sufficient to relieve the
carrier of his liability. Finally, the Norwegian expert' 95 gave the following
answer-which seems to be the most natural one to the question: "In case
of an aircraft disappearing with the whole crew"-the expert said-"it
must be left to the courts to consider the proof after the circumstances, and
it is not possible to formulate specific rules hereon."
During the discussions of the Second Commission of CITEJA, Cairo,
November 1946, the problem was brought up again. 196 In reply to a question
concerning the carrier's possibility of furnishing the required proof in the
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case of an aircraft disappearing into the ocean, the rapporteur, M. Beaumont, answered: ". . As far as I am concerned I think that we shall not
decide upon the questions which the courts will have to deal with in the
different countries,"-thus giving expression to the same line of thinking
as the one stated by the Norwegian expert. Other members of the Commission seemed to incline towards an understanding according to which the
carrier could escape liability in the given case.
On the whole, the answers of the CITEJA experts seem to reflect an
attitude according to which the requirements for the carrier's proof should
be rather moderate. However, next time the question was raised, the opposite
views were prevailing. When discussing the revision of the Warsaw Convention in Madrid, September 1951, the Legal Committee of ICAO touched
upon the question of the unknown cause of damage in connection with its
examination of Art. 20. On that occasion it was stated both by the French
and the United Kingdom delegate that in cases of unknown cause of197damage
the carrier cannot show that he has taken all necessary measures.
In Rio de Janeiro, 1953-the last preparatory meeting before the revision of the Warsaw Convention at The Hague in 1955-the discussion was
focused on the problem of the unknown cause of damage by a Dutch proposal
for amendment of Art. 20 paragraph 1 which ran as follows:
"The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that the damage was not
or breach of duty on his part or on the part of his
caused by negligence 198
servants and agents."'
One of the purposes behind this proposal was to provide for the case
of unknown cause of damage to the effect that "the carrier should bear the
risk of the impossibility of proving the real cause of the accident, and that
meant that, consequently, the carrier would be liable." 199 After a lengthy
discussion the Dutch proposal was rejected by a vote of 11 to 8.200 As the
debate in Rio de Janeiro was repeated at The Hague Conference it will not
be made subject for further comments here, but the points of view advanced
will be dealt with in connection with the examination of The Hague discussions.
At The Hague the Dutch proposal was put forward again, and once
again it was rejected-this time by a vote of 28 to 8-and Art. 20 paragraph 1 remained unchanged. 201 This vote, however, does not justify the
conclusion that the majority of the delegates was opposed to the idea that
the carrier has to bear the risk of the impossibility of explaining the cause
of damage. An analysis of the discussion reveals that several delegates,
though agreeing in principle with the Dutch proposal as far as liability for
unknown cause of damage was concerned, voted against the proposal for
other reasons. That was the case, for example, with the United States delegate. While in agreement with the Dutch proposal with regard to inexplicable accidents, he disagreed, on the other hand, with the insertion of the
expression "negligence. ' 20 2 The German delegate expressed himself, in
principle, along the same lines, 20 3 and his remarks were fully endorsed by
the United Kingdom delegate. 204 A number of other delegates stated that
they did not favor any change in the present Art. 20 paragraph 1, the text
of which had already had a certain practical application without creating
205
difficulties.
Only two delegates expressed opposition to the Dutch proposal on the
grounds that they disagreed with the views concerning the unknown cause
of damage. The Italian delegate stated that with the Dutch proposal
"The carriers would find themselves in a worse situation than at present, if they had to prove that neither they nor their employees had committed a fault. In fact, it was easier to prove that one had taken the
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necessary
measures than to prove (negatively) that one had not been at
20 6
fault.
The Spanish delegate "did not think that the liability had to be imposed on
the carrier," either pursuant to the present text or to the Dutch proposal,
20 7
in cases of unknown cause of damage.
What conclusions are to be drawn from the discussions during the revision work and at The Hague Conference? It seems justified to conclude that
a tendency towards raising the standard of requirements to satisfy the
carrier's burden of proof can be perceived through these discussions. This
tendency is undoubtedly influenced by the ever increasing degree of safety
under which air carriage is performed.
But one more conclusion can be drawn from the debates-and this is
unfortunately the most conspicuous one: The present text of Art. 20 paragraph 1 is susceptible of conflicting interpretations, and, having not seized
the opportunity to amend the existing wording of the Article, the Conference
gave free rein to continuing uncertainty and conflicting decisions in the
application of Art. 20. Although it has to be admitted that even the most
well-formulated text may give rise to divergent interpretations, in particular with regard to the question of proof, no reason seems to exist why it
should be impossible to reach an agreement upon a wording of Art. 20
paragraph 1 which at any rate would have limited the possibilities of conflicting interpretations. The Dutch proposal appeared suitable for this
purpose. To agree upon the retaining of Art. 20 paragraph 1 is tantamount
to an agreement upon a highly ambiguous formula under the cover of which
almost any interpretation can be advanced-suitable for anyone-but for
(Continued in next issue)
the efforts of unification of law!
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